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FILÁRTIGA’S LEGACY IN AN ERA OF MILITARY 
PRIVATIZATION 
Laura A. Dickinson∗ 
 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala1 famously established the idea that domestic tort 
suits might be brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)2 against 
those accused of violating human rights norms.3 But what is the legacy of 
this case in an era of military privatization? And, in particular, are there 
available legal responses to what we might call the privatization of torture? 
These are not hypothetical questions. In the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where 
detainees were tortured and abused, the individuals involved in the torture 
included not only members of the military, but contractors hired from the 
private sector to do the interrogation and translation.4 If we see the principles 
of the recent Supreme Court decision in Rasul v. Bush5 applied broadly so 
that there is U.S. judicial review of government-run detention facilities 
anywhere in the world,6 it is not far-fetched to think that we might see an 
increasing turn to privately run detention facilities using private contractors 
for supervision and interrogation in order to avoid such constitutional 
oversight. 
 Moreover, because many international human rights are framed as rights 
against state overreaching, the turn to private actors might, at first blush, 
appear to present a significant problem for legal accountability. For example, 
                                                                                                                   
∗  Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Essay was prepared for a 
symposium held in October 2005 at Rutgers University School of Law–Camden. 
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
3. 630 F.2d at 887-89. 
4. See P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 
2004, at B03 (“Sixteen of the 44 incidents of abuse the Army’s latest reports say happened at 
Abu Ghraib involved private contractors outside the domain of both the U.S. military and the 
U.S. government.”). 
5. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
6. See id. At 484-85 (ruling that federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas 
corpus petitions challenging the detention of foreign nationals in military custody outside the 
United States). Although the specific litigants in Rasul were detained at the U.S. naval base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it remains to be determined whether the holding of Rasul applies 
only to detainees in Guantanamo or to any detainees within U.S. military custody anywhere in 
the world). 
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torture is defined as abuse committed by official actors,7 and therefore it 
might appear that this “state action” requirement would effectively allow 
human rights abuses committed by private actors to go unredressed. Indeed, 
this has been precisely the concern raised by scholars about domestic 
privatization of prisons, schools, and healthcare and welfare programs.8 
Because U.S. constitutional scrutiny traditionally applies only to state 
actors,9 privatization has been seen as a way of potentially undermining 
constitutional oversight.10 
                                                                                                                   
7. The Torture Convention defines torture as only acts that are committed “by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture 
Convention], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm. 
8. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 23-24, on file with author) (contending that prison 
privatization threatens to erode fundamental public values such as the humane treatment of 
inmates and the integrity of the incarceration system); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374-76 (2003) (arguing that privatization limits the 
reach of constitutional norms and proposing a revival of the nondelegation doctrine as a 
means of applying these norms to a variety of privatized governmental activities). 
9. Having its genesis in an 1883 Supreme Court decision overturning Reconstruction-
era civil rights legislation, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the so-called “state 
action” doctrine rests on the observation that most constitutional commandments proscribe 
only the conduct of governmental actors. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). And though scholars frequently have criticized the 
state action doctrine for attempting to make incoherent distinctions between public and private 
action, see, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PENUMBRA (1968); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of 
“Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Duncan Kennedy, 
The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); 
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 
(1985), courts show no sign of discarding the doctrine. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National Collegiate Athletic Association is not a 
state actor); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) 
(holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation created by federal statute and given 
control over U.S. participation in the Olympics, as well as exclusive oversight of private 
amateur sports organizations participating in international competition, is not a state actor); 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that private nursing homes 
providing long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries are not state actors, even though they 
operate under contract with the government and make need determinations authorized by 
statute); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that private schools 
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 Yet, it is my perhaps controversial claim that military outsourcing may 
not, by itself, pose quite as serious an impediment to accountability as it may 
first seem. To the contrary, human rights abuses by private contractors may 
actually be more readily subject to legal action than abuses by official 
governmental actors, both through civil suits under the ATCA to redress 
violations of international human rights law, and through civil and criminal 
litigation to redress violations of domestic law. Using the Abu Ghraib prison 
abuse as a case study, this Essay will compare the possible forms of legal 
accountability for official governmental actors and private contractors, and 
suggest that the latter are at least as likely, and perhaps more likely, to be 
held accountable for abuses. 
 At Abu Ghraib, U.S. military personnel responsible for detention 
operations abused detainees by forcing them to strip and undergo acts of 
sexual humiliation, threatening them with dogs, applying electric shocks, 
subjecting them to mock executions, exposing them to severely cold weather, 
beating them, nearly suffocating them, and, in some cases, killing them.11 
Private employees operating under contract with the Department of the 
Interior as interrogators and translators participated in the abuse alongside 
uniformed military personnel and reportedly directed some of the activities.12 
Such acts clearly violated multiple norms embodied in both international and 
domestic law.13  
                                                                                                                   
statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs students). But see Brentwood Acad. 
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (holding that a private 
organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school athletic events is a state 
actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating 
prisoners pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor). 
10. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 8, at 1403 (arguing that “[t]he danger is that handing 
over government programs to private entities will operate to place these programs outside the 
ambit of constitutional constraints, given the Constitution’s inapplicability to ‘private’ 
actors”); see also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1507, 1508 (2001). 
11. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 19-20 
(2004); FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 
13 (2004); LIEUTENANT GEN. ANTHONY R. JONES & MAJOR GEN. GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 
INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
BRIGADE 68-95 (2004) [hereinafter FAY REPORT]; MAJOR GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 
15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16-17 (2004) [hereinafter 
TAGUBA REPORT]. 
12. FAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 130-35; TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 11, at 48. 
13. Under international law, the abuses could be characterized as torture; cruel, 
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 Despite the magnitude of these violations, however, the avenues for legal 
redress, even against the governmental actors, are extremely limited. First, 
there are few, if any, international, Iraqi, or transnational venues in which the 
governmental actors or entities could be held criminally or civilly liable. The 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has no jurisdiction over Iraq,14 and, 
even if it did, under the complementarity principle, any domestic 
investigation or prosecution would defeat jurisdiction.15 No other 
international criminal tribunal has jurisdiction, either. Iraq could theoretically 
bring a complaint against the United States before the Human Rights 
Committee, the body charged with monitoring implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).16 However, 
                                                                                                                   
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 7, 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 
[hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_ 
statute(e).pdf; Torture Convention, supra note 7, arts. 1, 16; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The acts might also constitute crimes against humanity if the 
abuses were “widespread or systematic” and committed “pursuant to . . . a State or 
organizational policy.” ICC Statute, supra, art. 7. In addition, the acts alleged would likely 
constitute offenses under U.S. law, which directly prohibits the international crimes of torture, 
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000), and war crimes, see id. § 2441, and which also 
criminalizes assault, murder, manslaughter, and maiming. See, e.g., id. §§ 111 (assault), 114 
(maiming), 1111 (murder), 1112 (manslaughter). Finally, the acts are crimes under Iraqi law, 
see Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 7, Penal Code, § 3 (June 10, 2003), 
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Code.pdf 
(adding prohibition on torture and cruel and inhuman treatment to Iraqi criminal code), and 
U.S. military law, see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000) (forbidding “cruelty and maltreatment”). 
14. Unless the Security Council authorizes a case to proceed, the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction only when either the State in which the alleged crime occurred or the State of 
which the accused is a national has consented to jurisdiction. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 
12(2). Neither the United States nor Iraq has consented to jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/ 
partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (listing the ratification status of 
the ICC Statute). 
15. Under the complementarity regime, the ICC may not consider a case if a State with 
jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case, “unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 
17(1)(a). 
16. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
arts. 28-45, U.N. Doc. A/G316 (Dec. 16, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/English/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf. Iraq and the United States have both ratified 
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State-to-State complaints in such a venue are extraordinarily rare,17 and it 
seems unlikely that, given Iraq’s continuing dependence on U.S. support and 
aid, the Iraqi government would risk souring its relationship with the United 
States by bringing such a complaint at any point in the near future. A suit in 
the International Court of Justice, while conceivable, is unlikely for the same 
reason. With regard to Iraqi courts, although criminal or civil proceedings 
could theoretically be brought locally, the U.S. Coalition Provisional 
Authority (“CPA”) granted immunity to U.S. and other foreign actors in 
Iraq.18 Moreover, diplomatic, head-of-state, and other immunities may apply 
to current and former officials, though it is of course an open question 
whether such immunity provisions can effectively shield individuals from 
accusations of gross human rights violations.19 Regardless, the Iraqi legal 
system is likely not stable enough to consider such politically charged 
cases.20 Finally, the prospects of a transnational suit in a third-party State 
under principles of universal jurisdiction are also slim. For example, though 
a group of Abu Ghraib victims filed an action for war crimes in Germany 
under that country’s universal jurisdiction statute,21 the statute requires 
                                                                                                                   
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 DECEMBER 1966 (Jan. 
26, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm. 
17. See HARRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 776 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that no interstate complaint has 
ever been brought under any of the United Nations treaty-body procedures). 
18. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised), Status of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, § 2(1) 
(June 27, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_ 
17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf (“Unless provided otherwise herein, the 
[Multinational Force], the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds 
and assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process.”). 
19. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction 
with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1075-80 (2004) (describing decisions of the 
British House of Lords concerning the immunity claims of former Chilean leader Augusto 
Pinochet); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. MDL 381, 04-CV-400, 2005 
WL 729177, at *76-85 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2005) (ruling that contractor immunity defense 
does not apply to international human rights claims). 
20. See Robert F. Worth, 2 from Tribunal for Hussein Case Are Assassinated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting on the political assassinations of Iraqi judges). 
21. See Criminal Indictment Against United States Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld et al. for War Crimes Perpetrated Against Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Detention 
Center 2003/2004, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/German_complaint_ 
English_Version.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (providing a literal translation of the 
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approval from the chief German prosecutor before jurisdiction can be 
exercised, and the prosecutor recently declined to move forward with the 
case,22 most likely because of its politically sensitive nature. 
 The best options for holding official actors liable, therefore, are 
domestic—but even these are not likely to be successful. There has been 
some accountability within the U.S. military justice system. According to the 
military, 251 officers and enlisted soldiers have been punished in some way 
for misconduct related to prisoners.23 These are mostly fairly low-level 
actors, however, and their punishments have been relatively light.24 Indeed, 
the highest ranking officer convicted in relation to the abuses is only a 
Captain, and though he was found guilty of kicking detainees and staging the 
mock execution of a prisoner, he was sentenced to only forty-five days in 
jail.25 Moreover, though the military has conducted some informal 
investigations, there has been almost no accountability at higher levels, 
despite suggestions that responsibility may lead further up the chain of 
command.26 To date, no criminal or civil cases have been brought in U.S. 
civilian courts, though such options are available at least in theory. Criminal 
prosecutions could also be initiated under U.S. statutes that criminalize 
torture27 and war crimes28 committed outside the United States. However, in 
light of the administration’s reluctance either to characterize the Abu Ghraib 
abuse as torture or to set a precedent for prosecutions of war crimes in 
civilian courts, such prosecutions are unlikely. Indeed, even though the acts 
of abuse may violate other federal laws for which military personnel can be 
held responsible, the administration may well be reluctant to prosecute such 
cases. Civil suits could be brought against U.S. government actors under 
international law using the ATCA,29 but such suits have usually been brought 
against non-citizens, and it is unclear how likely they are to succeed against 
                                                                                                                   
22. See German Prosecutor Rejects Investigation of Rumsfeld, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2005, at A9. 
23. See Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2006, at A1 (quoting a military spokesperson). 
24. See, e.g., id. (describing some of the cases and punishments received).  
25. See id. 
26. See id. (reporting that defense efforts to “point a finger of responsibility at higher-
ranking officers” have repeatedly failed and observing that, other than a few reprimands, 
“there is no indication that . . . senior-level officers and civilian officials will ever be held 
accountable for the detainee abuses that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan”). 
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000). 
28. Id. § 2441. 
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U.S. military personnel. Indeed, although an argument could be made that 
immunities should not apply to governmental officials accused of severe 
human rights abuses,30 a claim of immunity remains a potentially effective 
method to block a civil action.31 Avenues of relief under domestic law are 
similarly confined. It is at best uncertain whether the Constitution applies 
extraterritorially,32 and though the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) may 
waive sovereign immunity for some domestic tort suits,33 such waiver is 
quite limited.34 
 Viewed against this backdrop, the possibility of legal accountability for 
private actors, either individuals or corporations, does not seem significantly 
worse. While there are added hurdles for such actors in some settings, in 
others there is actually a greater likelihood of legal accountability. Certainly 
there is, again, no international court or tribunal that would be likely to 
exercise jurisdiction, but, as discussed above, that is no different than for 
governmental actors. Similarly, Iraqi courts are an unlikely venue both 
because of the possible applicability of the CPA immunity provision35 and 
because of the undeveloped state of the current Iraqi legal system—but these 
courts would be equally unavailable for proceedings against governmental 
actors. 
 Domestically, the military justice system is not available to try the non-
state actors because the U.S. Supreme Court has prohibited military trials of 
                                                                                                                   
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
31. For example, at the highest levels, head-of-state and diplomatic immunities might 
apply. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 41 I.L.M. 536, para. 
78 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment 
/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF (setting forth a judgment of the International Court of 
Justice, quashing an arrest warrant on immunity grounds). 
32. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004) (ruling that federal courts have 
habeas corpus jurisdiction over suits brought by detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but leaving ambiguous whether this jurisdiction extends to U.S. 
detention facilities elsewhere in the world); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 
265 (1990) (suggesting that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply only “to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community”); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 795 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Does a prisoner’s right to test 
legality of a sentence then depend on where the Government chooses to imprison him?”). 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
34. For example, suits arising from any discretionary function are barred, even if the 
government officials in question abused their discretion. See id. § 2680(a). 
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U.S. civilians absent a declaration of war.36 Yet, domestic criminal 
prosecutions in civilian courts may be more likely than such prosecutions of 
governmental actors. To be sure, prosecutions under the War Crimes Act or 
the statute criminalizing extraterritorial torture37 are unlikely for the same 
reasons that prosecutions of governmental actors are unlikely under these 
statutes: because the administration appears reluctant to characterize the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib as torture or to set a precedent for domestic civilian 
prosecution under these provisions. Moreover, prosecutors applying these 
statutes would need to show a sufficient nexus between the contractors and 
the governmental actors to establish state action (though this may not be a 
particularly onerous burden in this context).38 Nevertheless, prosecution 
under ordinary domestic criminal law, which forbids the acts committed at 
Abu Ghraib even if not characterizing them as torture, is a real possibility. 
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which was enacted precisely 
because U.S. military courts are not an option for private actors, specifically 
allows criminal charges to be brought against U.S. contractors working for 
the Defense Department.39 Of course, because many of the contractors in 
Iraq are operating under agreements with the CIA or with the Department of 
Interior,40 the statute would not apply in all cases. The USA PATRIOT Act, 
however, closes this loophole to some extent by expanding the United States’ 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (“SMTJ”) to include facilities run 
by the United States overseas.41 Thus, a prosecutor might bring charges 
against private actors mistreating detainees overseas if the abuse constitutes a 
                                                                                                                   
36. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248-49 (1960) 
(prohibiting military jurisdiction over civilian dependents in time of peace, regardless of 
whether the offense was capital or noncapital); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) 
(holding that civilian employees committing capital offenses are not amenable to military 
jurisdiction); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1960) 
(expanding Grisham to include noncapital offenses); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957) 
(holding that civilians in time of peace are not triable by court-martial for capital offenses). 
37. See supra note 13.  
38. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
39. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 
(2000). 
40. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and CACI Premier 
Technology, Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2004), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
docs/wow/CACI_ordersAll.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) (agreement to supply military 
interrogators). 
41. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. VIII, § 804, 115 Stat. 272, 
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crime within the SMTJ as long as the crime was committed within a U.S. 
facility.42 In fact, one private contractor who was working for the CIA and 
was implicated in detainee abuse in Afghanistan has been indicted in the 
United States for assault committed within the SMTJ.43 
 On the civil side, a number of possibilities also exist. Civil suits under 
the ATCA already have been filed against the contractors implicated at Abu 
Ghraib for violations of international law.44 Because they have been brought 
against private parties, these suits will need to demonstrate a link to state 
action, at least with respect to the claims of torture and other norms that 
require such a link.45 However, in the Abu Ghraib setting such a link may not 
be so difficult to establish because the private contractors were working in a 
facility actually run by the U.S. government. To be sure, there is some 
ambiguity as to whether the uniformed personnel were taking orders from the 
contractors or vice versa. Yet, under even the narrow construction of the 
state action doctrine found in U.S. constitutional law, or, alternatively, under 
a theory of joint criminal action, the activities at Abu Ghraib would probably 
be actionable. If the prison were managed entirely by private contractors, 
showing a nexus to the state would be more difficult. But while U.S. courts 
have imported the state action doctrine from U.S. constitutional law into 
ATCA cases, they have applied the doctrine in a much broader way than they 
have in ordinary domestic suits.46 International courts have also tended to 
apply theories of complicity, such as joint criminal enterprise, quite 
                                                                                                                   
42. See id.  
43. See Farah Stockman, CIA Contractor Is Charged in Beating of Afghan Detainee, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 2004, at A1. 
44. See T. Christian Miller, Ex-Detainees Sue 2 U.S. Contractors: Employees of Titan 
and CACI Are Accused of Torturing Prisoners. Lawyers Say the Action Is Based on a Military 
Report on Abuse, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A9. 
45. For example, as previously noted, see supra note 7, the Torture Convention defines 
torture as only acts that are committed “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Torture 
Convention, supra note 7. An ATCA suit based on an allegation of torture would therefore 
also need to satisfy this state action requirement in order to establish a violation of the law of 
nations. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States.” (emphasis added)). 
46. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 CIV. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (ruling that an ATCA complaint alleged sufficient complicity 
between governmental and private actors to survive a motion to dismiss), vacated in part by 
77 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 
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broadly.47 Thus, in the international context, even where private actors wield 
considerable discretion to manage detention facilities, it is not nearly as 
difficult to demonstrate a sufficient link to the State. 
 Finally, an under-explored avenue is the extent to which ordinary 
municipal law, such as tort law, might provide norms that could be used to 
address human rights abuses like those committed at Abu Ghraib. For 
example, assault or battery in the law of many countries would cover the 
same conduct that would give rise to a torture claim. In many suits brought 
under the ATCA in the United States, plaintiffs assert state law tort claims 
under a theory of supplemental jurisdiction.48 But such claims might also be 
asserted directly through forms of transnational tort litigation.49 
 A significant advantage of these suits against private contractors, 
whether under international law and the ATCA or under municipal law, is 
that an argument can be made that governmental immunities do not apply. 
To be sure, for cases brought in the United States, contractors might argue 
that, in addition to immunities arguably granted by the CPA, they should get 
the benefit of the so-called “government contractor defense,” the immunity 
given to governmental actors under the FTCA.50 There is, however, at least a 
plausible argument that immunity should not apply to these types of claims. 
The case that establishes the government contractor defense, Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp.,51 involved a products liability claim (not a claim 
                                                                                                                   
47. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 79 (2005) (noting the trend and arguing that such broad 
use of complicity theories “if not limited appropriately, [has] the potential to lapse into forms 
of guilt by association, thereby undermining the legitimacy and the ultimate effectiveness of 
international criminal law”). 
48. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 195 (D. Mass. 1995) (asserting 
supplemental jurisdiction over municipal tort claims appended to human rights claims brought 
under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000))). 
49. See generally TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001) 
(collecting essays on using tort law to advance a transnational human rights agenda). 
50. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988) (ruling that 
government contractors can claim immunity from civil suit under the FTCA’s provision 
barring “‘[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a))). 
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regarding a services contract) and also limited the defense to circumstances 
in which the government set the design specifications with reasonable 
precision, leaving little discretion to the contractor.52 At least one court has 
concluded that the defense does not apply to international human rights 
claims.53 Even for domestic claims arising from tort and contract, an 
argument could be made that, because the government contracts for services 
at Abu Ghraib prison were not particularly specific, the contractor should not 
be able to invoke immunity.54 In any event, it is clear that when the 
government privatizes military functions, individuals seeking redress may 
actually have more avenues to pursue legal accountability than when the 
government performs military functions directly.  
 Military privatization thus may not jeopardize the possibility of holding 
human rights abusers accountable for their actions as much as it may at first 
seem. To be sure, part of the reason for privatization’s relatively limited 
impact is no cause for celebration. It is because the baseline of accountability 
for official governmental actors is quite low—that is, it is relatively unlikely 
that any court will hold military actors accountable for torture or other 
abuses.55 And the viability of legal claims against private military contractors 
who commit atrocities depends in part on the continued existence of the 
ATCA, a state of affairs that is by no means certain.56 Congress could choose 
to repeal the statute, and in the wake of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,57 courts 
could construe the statute quite narrowly.58 But even if the courts define the 
                                                                                                                   
52. See id. at 512-13. 
53. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 7, 90-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
54. Cf. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 688-89 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(rejecting the government contractor defense for tort claims against a private prison 
management corporation because the contract did not specifically require or approve of the 
corporation’s practices that led to abuse). 
55. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text. 
56. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce has lobbied Congress to 
repeal the statute. See, e.g., Conal Walsh & Oliver Morgan, UK Firms Face Lawsuits as Watts 
Quits ICC Post: Companies Left Fighting US Human Rights Act After Former Shell Chairman 
Resigns, OBSERVER, Apr. 4, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/ 
0,3858,4894566-110373,00.html (referring to such efforts). 
 57. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
58. Sosa limited the scope of cognizable ATCA claims to those that “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” Id. at 725. 
Needless to say, this formulation leaves open a tremendous amount of room for future 
interpretation and elaboration, and some courts may decide to construe the range of 
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substantive categories of international human rights claims subject to suit 
under the ATCA in a limited way, courts thus far have seemed willing to 
view the “state action” question under international law more broadly than 
they do domestically.59 It will be the task of practitioners to convince them 
that they should continue to do so. And, more importantly, transnational tort 
suits brought under domestic laws remain an under-explored means of 
holding human rights abusers accountable. Such suits against private military 
contractors will be necessary to continue building on Filártiga’s legacy. 
 
                                                                                                                   
59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
